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I. Anti-discrimination as a fundamental element of
German law
Before I get down to the main focus of my topic, the transposition
of European anti-discrimination directives into German labour law I would
like to give a short overview of the legal situation that existed before the
German legislator transposed the directives. There are two reasons for
this. Firstly, we will be able to retrace the extent to which the German
legislator had been in a position to make an effective contribution to
combating discrimination before Art. 13 was included in the EC Treaty by
the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was the basis for then enacting the anti-
discrimination directive. Secondly, even after the enactment of this
directive it was generally believed in Germany that no transposition was
in fact necessary as its essential elements were already anchored in
German law.
1. The rejection of discrimination in Basic Law
It is not so long ago that the 60
th anniversary of the end of the
Second World War was celebrated. The 8
th May, as the date of the official
end of German Nazism, is most certainly relevant to the topic under
discussion here. The National Socialist regime was one in which human
peculiarities played a decisive role, serving as the basis for discrimination
the extent of which today still cannot be comprehended by any feat of the
imagination. So it is not surprising that the explicit rejection of
discrimination was given constitutional status in the Basic Law of the
Federal Republic of Germany as early as 23
rd May 1949. Art. 3 of Basic
Law states
(1) All humans are equal before the law.
(2) Men and women are equal. The state supports the effective
realisation of equality of women and men and works to towards
abolishing present disadvantages.
(3) No one may be disadvantaged of favoured because of his sex,
parentage, race, language, home land and origin, his faith, or his
religious or political opinions. No one may be disadvantaged because of
his handicap.
and thus constitutes the central norm of German anti-
discrimination legislation. A comparison with Art. 13 EC indicates that the
German constitutional norm demonstrates the same approach, despite
the fact that no mention is made of age or sexual orientation. Art. 3 par.
2 and 3 of Basic Law prohibit both direct and indirect discrimination
providing there is no objective justification for discriminative practices in
individual cases. In as far as equal treatment of men and women isTHE TRANSPOSITION OF EU ANTIDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION INTO GERMAN LABOUR LAW 3
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concerned, Art. 3 par. 2 of Basic Law recognises not only the equal
treatment precept. Sentence 2 of the provision includes an additional
constitutional obligation to promote equality in the treatment of women.
Art. 3 par. 3 sentence 1 Basic Law, that postulates the ban on unequal
treatment founded on certain characteristics, was included most
especially because of the persecution and discrimination of minority
groups under the Nazi regime and is closely linked with the basic principle
of human dignity anchored in Art. 1 Basic Law. Unfortunately, no majority
was found in the German Parliament for an inclusion of sexual identity in
the catalogue of Art. 3 par. 3 at the time this article came up for
amendment in the year 1994. It was generally believed that this was
already sufficiently protected by the basic principles of human dignity,
general freedom of action and personal rights (Arts. 1 and 2 Basic Law).
A majority was, however, found for the inclusion of a ban on
discrimination against the disabled in Art. 3, aimed at strengthening the
position of disabled people in law and society.
2. Direct effect of fundamental rights?
A simple reading of Art. 3 Basic Law could lead to the impression
that this constitutional norm represents a ruling prohibition of
discrimination that encompasses all spheres of life. This assumption is not
true, however. It is necessary here to be acquainted with the discussion
of the so-called direct effect or – as it is more clearly termed in the
European context – the horizontal effect of fundamental rights that has
been going on in Germany since the 1950s and still has not been
concluded. The problem concerned in this context is whether or not
fundamental rights pertain solely to the state-citizen relationship (vertical
effect) or also to private relationships between citizens (horizontal effect).
General opinion today postulates a so-called indirect effect of
fundamental rights. In particular this indirect effect has evolved via the
general clauses and other indefinite legal terms of civil law. For this
reasons civil courts are obliged to take the system of values
predetermined in the fundamental rights into consideration when
applying or interpreting norms under private law. One opinion that is
gaining ground, one that does not necessarily contradict majority opinion,
assumes that the state has so-called protective obligations that arise
from the fundamental rights. According to this opinion the obligation on
the part of the state for the benefit of the fundamental rights of those
subject to the norms leads to the necessity of a consideration of the
values in the sense of creating a practical concordance. In other words,
even in the case of a relationship between two private persons the state
must guarantee a certain minimum floor of protection for the object of4 MAXIMILIAN FUCHS
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legal protection in question. This shall apply not only to the fundamental
rights of freedom but also the fundamental rights of equality, in other
words to Art. 3 Basic Law.
II. The position of the Federal Labour Court (BAG)
In contradiction to prevailing opinion, the Federal Labour Court
upheld the precept of direct applicability of fundamental rights in labour
law in the 1950s and 1960s. This standpoint had practical consequences,
in particular in the case of collective agreements. The question arose as
to whether parties to a collective agreement were bound by the
fundamental rights. The Federal Labour Court affirmed this, on the
grounds that the parties in collective agreements had been given the
right to enact legal norms by the state. As the state itself was bound by
the fundamental rights it must then follow that this applied equally to the
partners of collective agreements exercising their authority to conclude
contracts. The Federal Labour Court justified such direct application with
the change in the meaning of the fundamental rights with the effect that
“a series of significant fundamental rights in the constitution, albeit not
all, guarantee not only rights of freedom against the authority of the
state, … but (are) in fact regulatory principles for social life, that have a
direct effect even on the private legal relationships between citizens, this
arising from fundamental rights to an extent still to be developed more
closely.” The practical consequences of such a legal conception are
obvious. As the Federal Labour Court was called upon to decide on a
clause in a collective agreement whereby married men, but not married
women, were entitled to an additional allowance for their spouses, this
was seen as a violation of the equality principle of Art. 3 Basic Law which,
due to the direct application of this provision, rendered the regulation null
and void for the collective agreement parties.
The present situation is characterised by the fact that no chamber
of the Federal Labour Court, nor of the Federal Constitutional Court
either, has stated its position on the theoretical contoversy of direct or
indirect applicability of fundamental human rights. However, the fact
remains that with regard to Art. 3 Basic Law this provision is called upon
as the authoritative guiding principle for the application and interpretation
of regulations crucial for deciding civil disputes. The following will touch
upon several significant judgments which indicate that the discrimination
prohibitions or rather equality of treatment precepts included in Art. 3
Basic Law have proved important instruments in the prevention of
discrimination. So it was that the Federal Constitutional Court held the
ban on night work for women that existed at that time as a violation of
Art. 3 paragraph 2 Basic Law and declared it unconstitutional. In many ofTHE TRANSPOSITION OF EU ANTIDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION INTO GERMAN LABOUR LAW 5
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its judgements the Federal Labour Court has objected to cases of open
discrimination against women that were intended for inclusion in
collective agreements on the grounds that they violated Art. 3 Basic Law
and has thus made a significant contribution to these formulations of
open discrimination being excluded for the most part from collective
agreements. Moreover, the Federal Labour Court has been called upon in
many cases to rule on questions of discrimination with regard to such
characteristics that are subject to prohibition under Art. 3 par. 3 Basic
Law. A few exemplary cases can be cited in this context. The first
concerns the beliefs and religious views of an employee. The ban on
discrimination for these reasons in Art. 3 par. 3 Basic Law is further
strengthened by the formulation of the fundamental right in Art. 4
paragraph 1 Basic Law in which freedom of faith and of conscience, and
freedom to profess a religious or philosophical creed is declared
inviolable. On many occasions the judgements of the Federal Labour
Court were concerned with situations characterised by the fact that an
employee declared a faith, religious convictions or matters of conscience
that were objectively, or in the opinion of the employer, inconsistent with
the proper execution of the work to be performed. Three striking cases
shall serve to illustrate the complex of problems. In one case the head of
the research department of a pharmaceutical company had refused to
work on the development of a new drug because the substance could also
be used for military purposes so that the employee opposed its
production on medical-ethical grounds. The employee was warned once
and then given notice by the employer. The Federal Labour Court put
high store by the fundamental right anchored in Art. 4 Basic Law and
declared a dismissal to be lawful only if it had not been possible to give
the person concerned another adequate work assignment. A second case,
that not surprisingly attracted great public attention, concerned a sales
assistant in a department store who wore a headscarf. The Federal
Labour Court granted the religious creed precedence over the interests of
the employer provided there was no specific real danger to the success of
sales. The question of sexual orientation – as mentioned above – is not
included in the attributes listed in Art. 3 Basic Law. Despite this the
Federal Labour Court declared a dismissal as invalid that had been based
solely on the homosexual inclinations of an employee. Its reasoning was
based primarily on the fundamental right in Art. 2 par. 1 Basic Law
(personal freedoms) and stated that the principle of good faith anchored
in civil law (§ 242 Civil Code) “ constitutes an intrinsic definition of
content for all rights, legal situations and legal norms within whose scope
the fundamental rights of freedom of contract must be balanced on the
one hand with the right of respect for human dignity and the freedom of6 MAXIMILIAN FUCHS
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development of personality on the other. It would therefore constitute an
abuse of legal rights should the employer exploit his private autonomy to
dismiss the employer during the probationary period solely on the basis
of his personal (sexual) behaviour.
In addition the Federal Labour Court has developed a so-called
general principle of equality of treatment from Art. 3 paragraph 1 Basic
Law, which the employer is obliged to observe with regard to all working
relationships. It states that an employer may not exclude one or
individual employees from benefits nor make any impositions on them
without objective reasons.
III. The ban on discrimination – the principle of
equality of treatment in German labour law
We have seen that Art. 3 and other fundamental rights of the
German Basic Law have played an important role in the fight against
discrimination in the area of labour law. Beside this contribution of labour
law courts, especially of the Federal Labour Court, we need now to
consider statutory law and its contribution to the prevention of
discrimination and the realisation of the principle of equality of treatment.
1. Sex equality provisions
a) The transposition of Directive 76/207/EEC and 75/117/EEC
Fulfilling its obligations under Directive 76/207/EEC and
75/117/EEC the German legislator enacted in 1980 equality of men and
women as a central principle of labour law. This was done by the
insertion of respective provisions into the Civil Code. Section 611 a
paragraph 1 of the Civil Code provides that an employer may not
discriminate against any worker on grounds of sex in connection with an
agreement or the adoption of a measure, particularly as regards
establishment of the employment relationship, promotion, the giving of
instructions or dismissals. A difference in treatment on grounds of sex is,
however, permissible if an agreement or the measure concerns an
activity which, owing to its specific nature can only be performed by
workers of a particular sex. With regard to sanctions section 611 a
paragraph 2 is shaped along the lines of the traditional law of damages.
In other words, liability for damages is dependent on the proof that the
employer was at fault. And liability for damages was only in respect of
the loss incurred by the worker as a result of his reliance on the
expectation that the establishment of the employment relationship would
not be precluded by a breach of the principle of equal treatment. As aTHE TRANSPOSITION OF EU ANTIDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION INTO GERMAN LABOUR LAW 7
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consequence, as was shown by the case 14/83 (von Colson and
Kamann), the regular award of damages comprised only travel expenses
and postal charges.
Here we meet a typical German problem in the transposition of
European antidiscrimination directives. Since the realisation of the
equality of treatment principle was effected through civil law channels,
breaches of the principle had to be remedied in the same way as other
breaches of contractual duties or wrongdoing under tort law. Every other
outcome would have met with heavy resistance by the advocates of
German civil law doctrine. This was shown in the wake of the judgment of
the ECJ in the case von Colson and Kamann in which the ECJ laid the
foundation stone for the principle of effectiveness of sanctions. This
judgment met with strong criticism.
b) Positive action
Germany not only provided for a ban on discrimination of men and
women, but also tried to make a contribution to what is normally called
positive action. The German legislator was conscious of Art. 2 (4) of the
Equal Treatment Directive which provided that the Directive shall be
“without prejudice to measures which promote equal opportunity for men
and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities which affect
women’s opportunities” (current version of Art. 2 (8): “Member states
may maintain or adopt measures within the meaning of Art. 141 (4) of
the Treaty with a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men
and women.”).
A special obligation was also placed on the legislator in Art. 31 of
the Treaty on the establishment of German unity between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. § 1 states:
“It shall be the task of the legislator of united Germany to further develop
legislation on equal rights for men and women”. It was generally believed
that an improvement in the situation of women could not be achieved
solely with bans on discrimination, that indeed additional targeted
measures were required. The Law on Equal Rights from 1994 reflects the
legislator’s desire to implement this perception. This law was a
combination of three individual laws that all had different aims. The first
law, the Act on the Promotion of Women, applied only to the federal
public services and the federal courts. Whereby women were to be
promoted taking into consideration the precedence of ability, qualification
and professional accomplishment. A side effect of the promotion was to
be an increase in the percentage of women, in as far as fewer women
than men were employed in certain categories. The most remarkable8 MAXIMILIAN FUCHS
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measure was the compilation of promotion plans for women. Each
department was to set up flexible targets in order to increase the
representation of women in recruiting policies and professional
advancement. A large number of federal states have also enacted similar
equality laws for their state authorities. These became a matter of
European public attention after the provisions concerning the preferential
treatment of women in the filling of vacant positions became the subject
of legal disputes, which in the cases of Kalanke, Marshall and Badek led
to preliminary rulings by the ECJ whose judgments effectively clarified
the controversial issues.
In contrast, the second law - the so-called Act on the Protection of
Employees - applied to all employees in both the private and the public
sector. Its aim was the prevention of sexual harassment. This aim had
been achieved in Germany long before the European legislator was able
to rectify a similar concern in the amended Directive 76/207/ECC.
2. Positive action in favour of severely handicapped persons
Beginning after the end of the First World War and in the course of
the last century a fully-fledged system of employment promotion in
favour of severely handicapped persons was developed. Severely
handicapped persons are those whose capacity for work is diminished by
at least 50 per cent. It is a kind of positive action consisting of a bundle
of measures, in part requiring employers to hire a certain quota of
severely handicapped persons and to equip workplaces with facilities
suited to persons in question, in part providing financial means to
employers and handicapped employees in order to facilitate their
integration into the labour market.
3. Equality of treatment of atypical work
Germany was one of the first countries in Europe to create
comprehensive legislation concerning atypical work. In 1985 the Act on
Promotion of Employment was passed in which fixed-term contracts,
part-time work, job on call and job splitting got at least a rudimentary
regulation. Part of the regulation was a provision which prohibited
discrimination of part-time workers. But under section 6 of this Act it was
possible to opt out of the statutory provisions on part-time work through
a collective agreement even when the effect of this is to the disadvantage
of the employee. With this provision, the legislature was continuing in a
tradition of German labour law. As in many other areas, it was intended
that here, too, priority was to be given to the autonomy of collective
agreements. The assumption is that the parties to such agreements are
better able than the legislature to arrive at objectively permissibleTHE TRANSPOSITION OF EU ANTIDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION INTO GERMAN LABOUR LAW 9
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deviations from statutory provisions and, moreover, that these parties
are also sufficiently able to protect the interests of employees. In
practice, therefore, collective agreements in Germany included numerous
provisions confining particular payments and other benefits and
advantages exclusively to full-time workers. Since many women part-
timers objected to such discriminatory rules in collective agreements,
numerous cases were brought in which the subject-matter of the
proceedings was the review of such provisions. The ECJ was therefore
presented with many such cases in the form of references for preliminary
rulings. Having once determined that the principle of equal treatment
contained in Art. 141 (ex-Art. 119) EC also applied to collective
agreements, the Court had to overturn numerous provisions in collective
agreements relating to the exclusion of part-time workers from particular
benefits on the basis of principles which it had developed in the context
of ex-Art. 119 EC. The jurisprudence of the ECJ has without question had
a decisive influence on the regulation of part-time work in the Federal
Republic of Germany. The Federal Labour Court followed the lines
established by the ECJ and embarked on this approach in the
interpretation of the anti-discrimination rule in the Act on Employment
Promotion. As a consequence at the latest since the second half of the
1990s discrimination of part-time workers has practically disappeared.
4. Protection of elderly workers
For many years securing the access of the elderly to the labour
market and safeguarding their rights has been one of the most urgent
and difficult problems to be solved. The size of the problem is illustrated
by the fact that only 40 per cent of German shops employ at least one
worker older than 50. Many steps were taken to get people back into the
labour market, especially in the field of social security and employment
promotion by the Federal Labour Agency, without great success. As far as
labour law is concerned both legislation and labour courts made sure that
employment contracts did not automatically terminate at a certain age
level fixed by individual employment contracts or collective agreements.
Setting a compulsory retirement age is acknowledged only when there
are objective reasons for this (for example termination of employment
contracts of aircraft pilots for security reasons). With regard to fixed-term
contracts entered into by elderly persons it may suffice to the well-known
case Mangold (C-144/04). In its judgment the ECJ held the German law
pursuant to which a fixed-term employment shall not require objective
justification if when starting the fixed-term employment relationship the
employee has reached the age of 58 (until December 2006: the age of
52) incompatible with EU law. Since the facts of the case and the10 MAXIMILIAN FUCHS
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argumentation by the court are well-known I avoid detailing again the
background of the case. In the following I shall concentrate on the impact
which the judgment has had upon the developments in my country.
It is small wonder that the judgment met – as in many other
European countries – with heavy criticism. I cannot outline in detail the
manifold arguments put forward by the critics. Certainly the most central
target of the critics was the assumption by the court that the principle of
non-discrimination on grounds of age is a general principle of Community
law. Apart from particular arguments to characterize the common
tendency of the critics one might say that – as one author has put it – the
ECJ uses the principle of proportionality and its link to the principle of
equality as a weapon to put through its own social policy concept thus
denying the competence of member states for shaping their social
policies of their own ideas.
Against this critical reception of the ECJ line of reasoning it may
seem astonishing that the Federal Labour Court in a judgment of 26 April
2006 obediently followed the ECJ decision in the Mangold case. It was not
blind obedience, on the contrary it defended the ECJ position deliberately
with admirable clarity. I single out two aspects of the decision. Firstly
with reference to the statement by the ECJ in which the national judge is
called upon for setting aside section 14 par. 3 of the German law on
fixed-term contracts although the period prescribed for transposition of
the directive has not yet expired, the Federal Labour Court rightly
underlines that this statement is in full harmony with consistent case-law
of the ECJ und may not be confounded with the recognition of horizontal
direct effect of directives which the ECJ continuously has denied. The
second point to be referred to concerns that most contested statement
according to which the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age
can be found in the constitutional traditions common to member states.
Some critics had challenged this opinion by stating that only in the
constitutions of two member states (Finland and Portugal) a ban on age
discrimination is set down. In this context the Federal Labour Court
reminds the critics of the famous judgments of the German Constitutional
Court (Solange I and II). In the first decision of 29 April 1974 this Court
stated that in the present state of evolution of the Community it would
not renounce its right to uphold German fundamental rights. And only
due to the fact that the ECJ elaborated on and developed a fully-fledged
system of protection of fundamental rights the Constitutional Court
twelve years later declared its willingness to no longer examine the
compatibility of Community legislation with German fundamental rights.
Quoting from this latter judgment the Federal Labour Court puts
emphasis on that passage in which it is said that where certain rights areTHE TRANSPOSITION OF EU ANTIDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION INTO GERMAN LABOUR LAW 11
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protected to differing degrees and in different ways in member states,
the ECJ will look for some common underlying principle to uphold a part
of Community Law. Even if a particular right protected in a member state
is not universally protected the ECJ will strive to interpret Community
Law so as to ensure that the substance of the right is not infringed.
As far as the answer to the ECJ judgment by the German legislator
is concerned at the end of last year the Ministry of Labour presented a Bill
which comprises a bundle of measures to improve occupational
opportunities for the elderly people. And one of the provisions of the
proposed law is aimed at meeting the requirements of the ECJ judgment
in the Mangold case. An amendment is envisaged pursuant to which
fixed-term contracts between an employer and an employee who has
reached the age of 52 can be entered into if he has been unemployed for
a period of at least four months or has received a special benefit which is
awarded in situations of restructuring or if he has taken part in vocational
training. The fixed-term may amount to up to a maximum of five years.
Up to this time limit successive contracts of employment are allowed.
IV. The transposition of EU discrimination law in
Germany
As you probably know, Germany has missed nearly every deadline
provided for in the European directives combating discrimination. And it
was only in August 2006 that Germany discharged its duties under
European law. In the following I shall present the various attempts made
in my country to transpose the directives and to show the difficulties and
hurdles which could not be overcome. It is a story of the clashes between
different legal orders, the European legal order and the domestic German
legal order, clashes I would say, between different legal mentalities.
On 1 December 2001 the Federal Ministry of Justice presented the
draft of an Act on the prevention of discrimination in civil law. The title of
this law already tells much about the approach taken by the Ministry. The
ban on discrimination should become a central element of German civil
law or at least of selected areas of civil law. Therefore a special provision
was enacted to be inserted into the Civil Code. The proposed article 319 a
of the Civil Code read:
There shall be no discrimination on grounds of sex, race, ethnic
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation in relation to
the conclusion, contents and termination of contracts
a) which are offered publicly
b) the subject matter of which is employment, medical
assistance or education.12 MAXIMILIAN FUCHS
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From the explanatory memorandum we can gather that the
proposed law was intended to transpose Directive 2000/43. With regard
to employment contracts the memorandum announced the creation of a
special law implementing Directive 2000/78. Nevertheless the proposed
article 319 a extended the ban on discrimination to include all reasons of
discrimination contained in Directive 2000/78.
In choosing this approach the ministry hit a raw nerve. And in
hindsight one can say that the choice of this strategy accounts for the
shelving of the transposition of the directives for nearly five years. The
publication of the bill was the beginning of one of the fiercest ideological
battles among academic scholars, practical lawyers and politicians. It was
mainly the voices of influential civil law scholars which characterised the
discussion. To cut a long story short, the crucial argument was dedicated
to the defence of one of the most cherished principles of civil law, private
autonomy, or the right of the parties to enter into contracts of their own
free will.
The critics did not question that the fight against discrimination
was needed and that it should be waged with determination. But the
command not to discriminate should be restricted to the state, not to
private citizens. Civil law therefore – they said – is not an area in which
the state is allowed to dictate its morality to its citizen in order to create
a morally better world. On the contrary, the law of contract is governed
by the dominance of the free will of the people. It is an area of freedom
in which everybody is free to determine their private life according to
their subjectively defined interests and preferences. “Stat pro ratione
voluntas” – is the anthem of private autonomy. In contrast to this, the
bill in question follows the guideline “Pro voluntate stat ratio”. Against
this background it is small wonder that one author formulated:
“Discriminations are systematically inherent to societies and economies
based on freedom. As a consequence, bans on discrimination represent in
the area of private law – as opposed to the area of public law – a
dangerous foreign element”.
This position was widely accepted among private law scholars,
opposite points of view were voiced mainly by public law experts. And the
battle was won, at least for the coming years by the private law
community. The government withdrew the bill, whereby the coming
election in 2002 certainly played a role.
Not until December 2004 did the then competent Ministry for
Families, Elderly, Women and Youth present a new bill, called the Act on
the transposition of European anti-discrimination directives. The
discussion about this new draft got underway in 2005. On 28 April 2005,
during the ongoing debate, the ECJ delivered its judgment in an actionTHE TRANSPOSITION OF EU ANTIDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION INTO GERMAN LABOUR LAW 13
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brought against Germany by the Commission under article 226 EC. It
held that by failing to adopt Council Directive 2000/43/EC within the
prescribed period, Germany had failed to fulfil its obligations under that
directive.
The further fate of the bill was sealed by the political
circumstances in mid-2005 when chancellor Schröder, in a hitherto
unheard of procedure, successfully dissolved parliament and as a
consequence the parliamentary treatment of the bill came to a standstill.
In spring 2006 the new coalition of Christian Democrats and Social
Democrats presented a new bill which, apart from some minor changes,
followed along the lines of the 2004 bill. After a relatively hasty debate in
both chambers (Parliament / Federal Council) the act now called
“Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz” (General Act on Equality of
Treatment) was passed and came into force in August 2006.
V. The new Act on Equality of Treatment
I do not wish to outline the new law in detail. It is to a certain
extent a compound copy of the single European directives. This is true for
the scope of the Act (one section is dedicated to employment contracts,
another one to civil law contracts in order to implement Directive
2004/113), the definition of direct and indirect discrimination, the
creation of bodies which should oversee the functioning of the Act. A few
words may be said on the provisions which allow exceptions to the ban
on discrimination. We have made use of the occupational requirements
clause contained in article 4 of Directive 2000/78/EC, which states that a
difference in treatment does not constitute discrimination where, by
reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or
of the context in which they are carried out, such a characteristic
constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement,
provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is
proportionate. The wording of this article 4 has been chosen in section 8
of the Act. In addition according to article 4 paragraph 2 of the Directive
2000/78/EC, section 9 of the Act maintains the existing legislation
pursuant to which, in the case of occupational activities within churches
and other public or private organisations the ethos of which is based on
religion or belief, a difference in treatment based on a person’s religion or
belief shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of
these activities and of the context in which they are carried out, a
person’s religion or belief constitute a genuine, legitimate and justified
occupational requirement, having regard to the organisation’s ethos. This
exception clause includes the right of churches and similar organisations
to require individuals working for them to act in good faith and with14 MAXIMILIAN FUCHS
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loyalty to the organisation’s ethos. As a consequence the jurisprudence
by the Federal Labour Court and backed by the Constitutional Court
which justifies dismissals of employees for having violated Catholic or
Protestant canon law is being maintained. For example if an employee
working with a church employer gets divorced and remarries, he can be
dismissed for this reason. And the justification of the dismissal does not
depend on the hierarchical position of the employee. In other words, the
same standard of good faith or loyalty is required from the director of a
church school or of the housekeeper.
A brief remark should finally be made on the justification of
differences in treatment on grounds of age. You know that article 6 of
Directive 2000/78/EC gives wide discretion to member states in this area
by stating that differences in treatment on grounds of age shall be
objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim including
legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training
objectives if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and
necessary. With reference to this article section 10 of the German Act has
provided for a long catalogue of exceptions consisting of eight items
which more or less reflect, what was accepted by legislation or
jurisprudence in the past. It is not certain whether these practices can be
upheld in the future. I am thinking especially of those provisions which
govern the access to employment, especially in the public sector. For
example, in principle you cannot become a civil servant over the age of
32, sometimes the age level is even lower. As time is pressing I cannot
continue discussing these kinds of exceptions. But I am sure that many
practices cherished in the past will not survive.
Instead of further detailing of the Act, I would prefer to sort out a
few aspects of the Act which reflect the typical German-ness of the
solutions chosen and the difficulties linked to them, difficulties for which
one day we shall probably face problems with Community law before the
ECJ.
1. Exclusion of dismissals from the scope of the Act
The new Act does not cover dismissals of workers. Section 2 par. 4
of the Act reads: “Dismissals are exclusively subject to the provisions on
the general and particular protection against dismissals”. Why this
exemption from the ambit of the Act although article 3 of Directive
2000/78 which defines the scope of the directive refers to employment
and working conditions including dismissals? Some authors have
defended the solution chosen by saying that German dismissal legislation
itself does not allow discrimination although this is not expressly said. But
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labour courts, impede dismissals on grounds listed in section 1 of the Act.
Others have argued that the current legislation and its application by the
courts may impede discriminatory dismissal for the bulk of the cases,
nevertheless situations remain in which indirect discrimination, which
cannot be ruled out by the current law, may take place. This is not the
place to comment on who is right and who is not. More important is to
ask why this exemption clause, which was not provided for in the original
version of the bill, was put through by the Federal Council, the
representation of the German Länder in the last minute of the legislative
procedure. We do not know exactly. In my eyes the answer has to be
found in – and recent experience shows it – the widely nurtured fears by
academic scholars, but of course also within the ranks of political
representatives, that too strong an intrusion of European anti-
discrimination law could compromise the normal functioning of labour
laws which have proven effective and are accepted by both sides of the
employment relationship. Any further opening of the floodgate could
threaten the equilibrium of the status quo. The exemption clause in
question reminds us of the debate in the wake of the first bill of 2001,
where not few authors voiced the opinion that due to the current state of
law there was not much need for further implementation of European
anti-discrimination law and as a consequence advocated only minor
changes and amendments to the existing law.
2. The regulation of sanctions
As we have seen above, Germany has opted with regard to
sanctions for a civil law solution. The original version, as it was enacted in
1980, was a clear-cut damages model based on the fault principle and
the recovery of compensatory damages. The ECJ taught us another
lesson and therefore the German legislature adapted to it. We eliminated
the fault principle, allowed for the recovery of pecuniary damages
suffered from violation and provided for general damages (non-pecuniary
damages). In the wake of the judgment of the ECJ in the case
Draehmpaehl we differentiated in the definition of the amount of
damages between job applicants who, because the successful applicant
had superior qualifications, would not have obtained the position, even if
the selection process had been free of discrimination and those who
would have obtained the position if the selection process had been carried
out without discrimination. The damage suffered by an applicant
belonging to the first category may not exceed a ceiling of three months’
salary. In this way we had established rules which fully stuck to the
requirements under European law. We could have used these rules as a
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only gender discrimination, but extended to many other grounds of
discrimination. But we did not do this. Why not?
In the past much criticism was put forward against the existing
system of damages in cases of discrimination on the grounds of gender.
Critics argued that the existing provisions were not in tune with
fundamental principles of German civil law which is based with regard to
recovery of damages on the fault principle and the recovery of only those
pecuniary damages the existence of which is proven. Within contracts this
scheme works as follows. The party to a contract who has done damage
to the other party is obliged to make the damage good because the law
presumes the fault of the wrongdoer. But the wrongdoer has a defence,
he can be exculpated by proving that the damage was not caused by
violation of his duties. If the defendant is not exculpated, he is liable to
restore the person damaged to the position he would have been in, had
he not been damaged. The assessment is individualised to suit the actual
position of the particular person and is therefore related to the actual loss
suffered. Beside the compensation of financial harm, non-pecuniary
losses may be awarded for impairment of the plaintiff’s body or health,
his freedom of movement or his sexual self-determination.
It is exactly this damages scheme which the new Act on equality
of treatment wanted to put into practice. Section 15 par. 1 of the Act is
the mere transfer of the responsibility rule from the law of contracts into
the area of sanctions for discrimination. This means only actual damages
may be awarded and the employer can defend himself by showing that
discrimination was not a breach of duty on his part and therefore he
cannot be blamed for fault. Section 15 par. 2 provides for the
compensation of non-pecuniary damages which is not based on the fault
principle. Evidently the German law wanted to meet the requirements
established by the ECJ to guarantee real and effective judicial protection
which means compensation must have a real deterrent effect on the
employer. No ceiling is fixed for the amount that may be awarded save in
the situations described above in which the victim of the discrimination
would not have obtained the job due to superior qualifications of the
successful applicant. In this case the maximum amount of damages is
three months’ salary.
Here again, we can detect the dominance of German civil law.
Emphasis was laid on safeguarding the traditional model for recovery of
damages. Sanctions for discrimination should not be shaped differently
from other forms of breaches of contracts or torts. The only concession
made was the award of non-pecuniary losses without fault of the
employer, a concession due to the consistent jurisprudence of the ECJ. It
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recovery of pecuniary damages. Some German authors expect such an
outcome, reasoning that the otherwise no-fault-principle for the award of
non-pecuniary losses constitutes an effective and deterrent sanction in
the sense of the consistent jurisprudence of the ECJ.